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Introduction 
The previous chapter gave an account of the historical development of large housing estates, referring also to 
the problems of these estates in the process of their 'natural' development. This chapter features a separate 
discussion of the period of privatisation (starting in the early 1980s in Great Britain and continuing on a 
large scale in the 1990s in the post-socialist countries), since this highly political process has had a profound 
effect on the future perspectives of the housing estates in these countries. 
As previously outlined, the large housing estates, which are the subject of this book, have a range of 
elements in common. The estates were built at the same time; they were built by either a local government 
authority, or the state, or not-for-profit organisations; and they represented contemporary, state-of-the-art, 
professional architectural and engineering views on residential development. The estates also had their 
differences: some were the first, or even the only, modern not-for-profit housing available in a period of 
recovery after the Second World War and in economies with no tradition of social-rented housing; 
others were a new element in established social- and public-rented housing provision. In these cases the 
estates did not necessarily offer the most desirable dwellings or locations and this drawback of ten became 
more apparent over time. In some cases this generation of public and social-rented housing was targeted at 
different social groups and had a different place in the policy agenda: rehousing households from urban 
renewal or slum housing neighbourhoods rather than meeting general housing needs. 
All these elements of similarity and difference existed when the estates were built. The standing and quality 
of these estates, however, is not purely attributable to these initial characteristics. The history of 
maintenance and repair has affected the quality and attractiveness of the estates. At the same time the 
characteristics of the households living in the estates has changed and it has been argued that in some 
countries these estates have been more profoundly affected by the process of residualisation than other 
estates. 
This chapter is concerned with a further element in the changing nature of these estates: the changes in 
patterns of ownership and control associated with privatisation. The characteristics of these large estates 
today - and the challenges for policy - are affected by privatisation and the different tenure structures arising 
through privatisation. The problems and policy solutions depend not only on the design, scale, and other 
features of the built environment, but also on fragmented ownership and privatisation. 
This chapter draws on the experiences of four countries (the OK, Hungary, Slovenia and the Netherlands). 
This permits a discussion of the diversity of privatisation experience in Europe. In the OK, housing 
privatisation has formed part of the broader restructuring of the welfare state initiated by the Thatcher 
administration in the 1980s (Forrest and Murie, 1990) and continued by its successors. In Hungary and 
Slovenia, housing privatisation formed part of the widespread economic, social and political upheaval that 
accompanied the end of statist central planning in the 1990s. In the Netherlands, housing privatisation has 
been limited, in the context of a country in which welfare reform, generally, has been more modest. 
The focus is on how privatisation has affected the contemporary situation in different countries. Particular 
attention is drawn to the fragmentation of control and the issues facing policy in relation to renewal and 
restructuring. We start by describing briefly the three types of privatisation and the four countries discussed 
here. We then refer to the nature of the large estates before privatisation and then discuss the processes and 
scale of privatisation. The consequences of privatisation are then considered in terms of who benefits, and of 
management. Finally, consideration is given to the imp act of privatisation and the outcome for large post-
war housing estates, the problems and issues that privatisation has left on these estates, and the responses 
that are currently being adopted in the various countries. 
                         
1 In.: van Kempen, R., Dekker, K., Hall, S. and Tosics, I.(eds): Restructing large housing estates in Europe. Chapter 5, 
pp. 85-104.. The Policy Press, University of Bristol, Great Britain, 2005 
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Types of privatisation 
The privatisation of former public and social housing became a common the me in housing policy 
throughout Europe. Privatisation itself has taken different forms; discussions of policies that have involved 
elements of privatisation have referred to the movement of rents towards market levels, the contracting out 
of various services to private sector agencies, and the transfer of ownership in various forms. This chapter 
concentrates on these latter aspects. It refers to the transfer of ownership, in particular to sitting tenants or 
other individual owners. 
We draw on three different types of experience within Europe. The first example, illustrated by the UK, is 
where enthusiastic and wide measures to achieve privatisation prevailed. The introduction of the Right-to-
Buy scheme in the UK grew out of ideological and electoral considerations and a desire to encourage home 
ownership for its own sake (Forrest and Murie, 1990; Jones and Murie, 1999). Privatisation nevertheless 
involves consumer choice. Selectivity over what is sold is consumer-driven: almost all tenants have the 
Right-to-Buy, and it is not time limited. 
The second type of privatisation relates to those that took place in Eastern and Central Europe and were 
associated with changes in political regimes in the late 1980s. These privatisations have been discussed 
elsewhere (Turner et al, 1992;Alexander and Skapska, 1994; Hegedüs and Tosics, 1994; Mandi, 1994; 
Stanovnik, 1994;Tanninen et al, 1994; Sendi, 1995; Struyk, 1996; Priemus and Mandi, 2000; Lowe and 
Tsenkova, 2003). They are widely presented as political shock absorbers, demonstrating how changes in 
political regimes have direct, tangible effects on individual households and citizens. It is also argued that 
privatisation in these circumstances was strongly influenced by the burden that the ownership of properties 
with potentially high maintenance and repair costs would have placed on new systems of local government. 
In these types of privatisation a Right-to-Buy was a common phenomenon (and the price paid was even 
lower than in the UK), but it was often only available for a relatively short time period and was then 
replaced with a different policy. In some cases privatisation was introduced along with restitution, whereby 
the people who had previous claims on land or property that had been seized by earlier regimes could 
reclaim it (Tanninen et al, 1994; Sendi, 1995; Struyk, 1996; Fisher and Jaffe, 2000; Lowe and Tsenkova, 
2003). In this chapter we have illustrated the problems and processes associated with this type of 
privatisation through reference to Hungary and Slovenia. While there are considerable similarities between 
the two cases, there are also some differences. 
The third, more cautious, approach to privatisation is illustrated by the Netherlands. Along with many other 
European countries the Netherlands has avoided a wholesale commitment to privatisation. 
Nevertheless, significant privatisation measures have been introduced, and there has been some debate and 
conflict over how these should be applied (Aalbers, 2004). 
 
The policy process 
Table 5.1 sets out key features of the process of privatisation in the three types and four countries referred to 
in this chapter. 
The earliest mass privatisation is associated with the UK, where significant numbers of council houses had 
been sold to sitting tenants who then became homeowners well before the introduction of the Right-to-Buy 
in 1980 (Murie, 1976). It was the introduction of this Right-to-Buy,2 however, which transformed the scale 
and coverage of privatisation; most accounts of privatisation see 1980 as the key date. 
Legislation introduced a uniform national scheme that provided a right for almost all sitting tenants in local 
authority housing and the tenants of some housing associations to buy the property in which they lived. The 
legislation gave them clear entitlements in relation to the price at which they could purchase and the 
discount on market valuation to which they were entitled. These discounts were substantial and were further 
increased so that they could amount to 70% of the market value in some cases. Although there have been 
                         
2 Strictly speaking, the Right-to-Buy has not applied in Northern Ireland but a very similar house sales scheme has operated there 
and in this chapter reference to the Right-to-Buy in the UK includes the Northern Ireland house sales scheme. 
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some subsequent modifications that reduce the maximum discount that can be obtained in some places, the 
Right-to-Buy provides an unambiguous entitlement to tenants. This entitlement cannot be blocked by the 
landlord, although stock transfer (the transfer of council housing to not-for-profit housing organisations) 
does affect entitlement. Where stock transfer has taken place existing tenants have a 'preserved' Right-to-
Buy, but no new tenants (those with assured tenancies created after the stock transfer has been completed) 
have the Right-to-Buy. To this extent the entitlement under the Right-to-Buy legislation is slowly being 
diminished by a second form of privatisation: the transfer of ownership to housing associations. Leaving this 
aside, the process is activated by the tenant. Although there have been some surges in sales activity 
associated with changes in the detail of the Right-to-Buy, or rumours that it was to be more dramatically 
modified (see Marsh et al, 2003), in general the progress of the Right-to-Buy has f1uctuated with housing 
market and economic changes Jones and Murie, 1999). 
 
Table 5.1: Privatisation processes  
 UK Hungary Slovenia the Netherlands 
Starting point Public sector 
housing provided 
mainly by local 
authorities and 
comprising some 
32% of all 
dwellings with the 
highest proportions 
in urban areas 
State housing was 
19% of national 
housing stock and 
61 % in Budapest 
Social housing 
accounted for 33% 
of dwellings 
 
Social rented 
housing was 32% 
of dwellings in 
1990 and 37% in 
2000 
Policy approach Sustained Right-to-
Buy 
Big bang Right-to-
Buy 
Big bang Right-to-
Buy and restitution 
Landlord-managed 
sales schemes 
Target 
 
Sitting tenants to 
become 
homeowners 
Sitting tenants to 
become 
homeowners 
Sitting tenants and 
former owners 
Landlord-selected 
properties 
Wider policy 
agenda 
Previous 
discretionary sales 
and concurrent 
stock transfer and 
other privatisation 
measures 
Transfer of state 
housing to local 
government and 
revitalisation of the 
law on 
condominiums 
Transfer of state 
housing to local 
government and 
establishment of 
condominiums 
Increased I1nancial 
autonomy of 
housing 
associations, 
enlargement of 
owner-occupied 
housing sector 
Period Earlier variable 
schemes replaced 
in 1980 by a 
uniform and 
continuing national 
scheme; some 
regional variation 
in maximum 
discount after 1998 
Uniform national 
scheme between 
1993 and 1994 
replaced by locally 
variable schemes 
within a national 
'framework' 
regulation 
Uniform national 
scheme between 
1991 and 1993 
replaced by locally 
variable schemes 
Increase in activity 
from the late 
1990s; further 
increases expected 
in the next few 
years 
Discounts High (average 
50%; 
maximum 70%) 
Very high (mostly 
over 70%; 
maximum 90%) 
Very high 
(approximately 
90%) 
Low to moderate: 
(up to 10% for 
third parties; up to 
30% if sitting 
tenants buy their 
own homes)  
Proportion sold 1 in 3 dwellings 
over the 20 years 
after 1980 
70% sold by the 
mid-1990s 
64% sold after 2 
years 
4% to 5% sold by 
2004  
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Source: RESTATE reports 
 
In contrast with the UK, Hungary and Slovenia have been affected by short-term explosions of activity. In 
these countries a Right-to-Buy was introduced, inspired by politics and following political changes (Tosics, 
2001). It was introduced as a short-timescale scheme, which was subsequently replaced by locally variable 
schemes. The unified national schemes operated for some two years in each case, and the brief window of 
opportunity that these provided, together with the much greater levels of discount, explains the much higher 
sales figures occurring in a short time period in these two countries when compared with the VK. 
In Hungary, the Housing Act (taking effect in January 1994) introduced a Right-to-Buy under which a local 
government authority could only resist the sale of flats in a building if the conditions of the building were 
very bad (health and safety aspects), if an earlier decision had be en taken to rehabilitate the area, or if the 
building was a listed monument. If none of these circumstances prevailed, the local government had to turn 
the whole building into a condominium and offer all the flats for sale, even if only one of the tenants 
declared a wish to buy. The prices paid were very low: in most cases (where the building had not been 
substantially renovated in the last 15 years) 15% of the market value; and 30% of the market value if the 
building had been substantially renovated in the last 15 years. In each case a further 40% discount was given 
if the ten ant paid in cash (otherwise, the tenant paid by instalments over 35 years, on a fixed 3% interest 
rate, although at that time inflation was around 30% per year). 
Rents for public housing in Hungary were traditionally very low, covering only 20-30% of the (low) 
maintenance costs, and the state-owned management companies did not carry out any comprehensive 
rehabilitation work. This neglect had left a legacy of disrepair and after 1990 the freshly elected democratic 
government did not want to deal with housing. Consequently, state ownership was transferred (at no cost) to 
local government. These local authorities could not afford to maintain the rental stock properly, or address 
the backlog of disrepair, and it was much easier for them to sell this stock. The Right-to-Buy in 1993 was 
endorsed by the elections in 1994 (although no political party opposed the policy). Providing real-estate 
ownership to the citizens was also in line with the philosophy of the transition. Finally, tenants wanted to 
buy their flats because they were afraid of possible rent increases. In order to facilitate sales, each building 
concerned was turned into a condominium and the homeowners received a share determined by the floor 
space of their units. The local government authority remained the shareholder for the flats where the 
residents did not want to buy and for those units used for commercial or other purposes. 
In Slovenia, the main reasons for the privatisation of the public stock were to re move the burden of high 
maintenance and renewal costs from the state budget, to generate a substantial amount of cash to assist the 
state budget during the critical period of establishing an independent economic base, to redistribute the 
wealth accumulated as 'public property' during the period of socialist rule, and to establish better housing 
management and maintenance and the refurbishment of multi-family housing. The 1991 Housing Act 
transferred the entire public housing stock into the ownership of the local authorities, which were obliged to 
sell dwellings to the sitting tenants if they or any of their immediate family expressed a desire to purchase. 
In this transaction, the buyer was entitled to: a 30% discount on the total value of the dwelling; a further 
deduction of the amount (calculated using a correction coefficient) the tenant had be en obliged to pay 
during the period of tenancy as a' contribution'3 to the social housing fund; and a discount equivalent to 
personal investments in the housing unit in the form of improvement. 
The tenant purchaser could either pay 10% of the total amount within 60 days of signing the purchase 
contract, with the rest to be paid in equal monthly instalments for the next 20 years; or pay the total amount 
within 60 days of signing the purchase contract. This latter method of payment attracted a 60% discount on 
the cost of the dwelling. This privatisation model applied equally to all public rental dwellings all over the 
country, with the major exception of restituted housing. The conditions for the privatisation of restituted 
property (previously nationalised housing) differed slightly from those described above. The sitting tenants 
in nationalised housing had three options. 
                         
3 The Housing Management Act passed in 1981 required all public housing tenants to pay a personal contribution (also popularly 
referred to as 'participation') into the housing fund intended for the construction of 'solidarity' housing. The level of contribution, 
refundable after ten years, varied and was determined as a percentage of the total value of the housing unit, also taking into 
consideration the social status, health situation, and economic capacity of the tenant. 
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They could either purchase the dwelling under the terms described above, on condition that the new landlord 
was willing to sell the property; or, provided nobody filed any claim for restitution, relinquish their right to 
the dwelling, in which case they would be entitled to a compensation of 30% of the value of the dwelling 
plus a loan of an equal amount with favourable terms of repayment; or stay on as tenants of the new 
landlord. Taking into account all the discounts and deductions, it is estimated that the average selling price 
for the dwellings sold off under the Right-to-Buy was a mere €100 per square metre, which is approximately 
10% of the then average market value in Slovenia. 
In both Hungary and Slovenia the transfer of all housing to local authorities and the establishment of 
condominiums for all dwellings in buildings where even one sale was completed meant that the whole stock 
(except for buildings that no one wanted to buy and buildings that were not available for sale because of 
renewal schemes, poor repair, or protection as a monument) was affected by privatisation and not just the 
stock purchased by sitting tenants. But the proportion of tenants who bought was also high and the brief 
window of opportunity within which advantage could be taken of the more generous Right-to-Buy in these 
countries was a key influence. While tenants triggered action - as in the OK - the pressure to take up the 
offer quickly before it diminished in value could be perceived as pressure from government authorities to 
hasten the process; the costs of delay for tenants acted as a strong pressure on uptake. 
Finally, there has never been a Right-to-Buy in the Netherlands. Unlike the countries referred to above, the 
Netherlands' approach to the sale of properties has been more cautious (Aalbers, 2004). At no stage has the 
political leadership been convinced by the case for privatisation. In addition, the relationship between the 
state and the main providers of social-rented housing has been different from elsewhere. The most important 
social housing providers - the housing associations - were formerly privately regulated institutions. Although 
they carne to function as branch offices of government in the 1950s, 19605, and 19705 (when social housing 
was built in massive quantities), the associations became more independent of both central and local 
government in the 1990s. 
Until the early 19905, it was virtually impossible to voice the idea of selling social housing in Dutch 
political circles. The few attempts that were made were rather half-hearted (Boelhouwer, 1988; Frissen et al, 
2001). Because so many conditions were attached to sales, they were very few. With the policy document 
'Housing in the Nineties' (Ministerie VROM, 1989) the central government took its first steps towards a 
withdrawal from the housing market, and privatisation became more common, but only since the late 19905 
has privatisation been a serious issue. 
In the mid 1990s the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) announced its plan to coerce the housing associations to 
sell one million of their approximately three million social housing units. After much discussion, the original 
Right-to-Buy idea was abandoned because the Dutch Labour Party does not hold the majority of seats in 
parliament and was unable to persuade other political parties to agree to the plan. Many members of 
parliament who opposed it were afraid that a Right-to-Buy scheme would lead to the marginalisation and 
residualisation of the social housing stock (the British situation was sometimes referred to as a 'worst case 
scenario'), while other members of parliament indicated that they did not have the power to force the 
housing associations into a Right-to-Buy scheme. A new plan emerged for a more moderate 'Stimulation-to- 
Buy' scheme that would offer subsidies to low-income households towards purchase. A majority of members 
of parliament supported the Stimulation-to-Buy scheme and this was included in the Promotion of Home 
Ownership Act (BEW), passed in 2000 and coming into force in 2001, and the 2000 Policy Document on 
Housing.  
What has emerged from this is an arrangement of landlord-driven managed sales schemes in which the 
landlord chooses what to sell. Although there has periodically been pressure from the central government to 
adopt a more general approach to privatisation, the process has remained firmly within the control of the 
housing associations. The volume of sales under these schemes has been very much lower than in the other 
two cases, although it has risen in recent years; the Minister of Housing has frequently stressed that a 
'change of attitude' is needed. Although the minister has little direct control over the independent social 
landlords, this change of attitude has taken place inside most of the organisations dealing with social 
housing. However, the properties and estates included in sale schemes have been selected by the landlords 
and not by the minister or the tenants. 
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Who benefits? 
Much of the research literature associated with housing privatisation has focused on who benefits from the 
process. There are subtle, and even major, differences in this respect. Perhaps the most substantial body of 
evidence relates to the sale of council houses in the UK where the better, more attractive properties have 
been sold (especially houses with gardens). The purchasers tend to be the more affluent of the households 
who were council tenants (middle to lower income groups in relation to the population as a whole, but not 
including the highest or lowest income groups) and in the middle of the family cycle (see the summary of 
various evidence in Jones and Murie, 1999). 
Properties in blocks of flats, and particularly in those blocks that were built in the 19605 and 19705, are less 
likely to have been bought. To some extent the Right-to-Buy in the OK has creamed off the best properties 
and the most affluent tenants from the state housing sector and the housing association sector, leaving a 
social-rented sector that is more residual in terms of property and with a narrower social profile of tenants. 
In contrast, in Hungary and Slovenia the scale of uptake of the Right-to-Buy is much higher. All tenants 
except the very poorest have participated in the Right-to-Buy. The process has been less socially selective 
than in the OK and less selective in terms of property types. 
This is partly because the large post-war mass housing estates in these countries provided some of the best-
quality housing in the best condition, especially when compared with the run-down, older properties in the 
cities. Consequently, the comparative attractiveness of these properties is gene rally higher than those in the 
DK, where they fit into a much more ambiguous position in, and would often be regarded as forming the 
bottom end of, the housing market. Even so, give-away privatisation in Hungary generates a huge equity 
problem arising from the difference between the market value and the discounted selling price. Taking into 
account the fact that the best public housing units were allocated according to merit in the socialist period, it 
is estimated that 40% of investment value went to households in the top quarter of the income distribution, 
while only 17% went to the lowest quarter (Hegedüs et al, 1996). 
In Slovenia there were two major groups of beneficiaries of public housing privatisation: the sitting tenants, 
who were given the opportunity to become homeowners at minimum cost; and the state, which acquired 
substantial financial resources in the process and also succeeded in ridding itself of the burden of housing 
management and maintenance. Those households living in apartments with a high market value (in the 
centres or in other favourable locations of major cities) benefited the most. On the other hand, the losers 
were the households living in restituted dwellings, who se Right-to-Buy was severely restricted. Most of 
these people are now tenants living under a constant threat of eviction (Sendi, 1995; Mandi, 1999). 
The pattern of benefit in the Netherlands is not so clear-cut, because of the selective process of sale 
orchestrated by landlords. Since landlords are intent on selling properties in order to achieve other objectives 
and, more importantly, because many tenants have declined the offer to buy their homes (not only because 
the monthly mortgage payments would be much higher than the monthly rent) a sale to third parties in the 
Netherlands is also possible, so that the beneficiaries of privatisation are not restricted to sitting tenants. 
 
New management arrangements 
Perhaps the most important impact of privatisation for the future management and development of the large 
post-Second World War estates is the change in the patterns of ownership and management of the estates. In 
this respect the Netherlands has seen relatively little change. The process of privatisation has sometimes 
been undertaken along with urban renewal projects. The new mixed-tenure neighbourhoods will have 
differences in ownership with respect to the previous housing association estates, but the major restructuring 
and renewal will have already taken place and the process will have been orchestrated by social landlords. 
Looking even further ahead, the patterns of ownership and control are familiar in the Dutch context and 
there is no reason to believe that they will present particular problems in the future. 
At the opposite extreme, the situations emerging in Hungary and Slovenia involve a condominium 
arrangement, but there are serious questions about how effectively these operate, especially in relation to the 
properties in the worst condition and the owners who have the fewest resources. In Slovenia, for example, 
the low-income homeowners are already experiencing considerable difficulties in meeting the costs 
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associated with home ownership (Sendi, 1999, 2004). In Hungary there has been a Condominium Act in 
operation since 1924 (although designed mainly for new buildings) and it has not been rescinded. In 
Slovenia there was no Condominium Act and the legal basis for regulating the condominium system was 
provided by the Housing Act and the Property Code. 
The situation in the DK differs from that in the Netherlands, Hungary, and Slovenia. Many of the properties 
sold under the Right-to-Buy, including some in the large post-war estates that are the focus of this book, 
were houses with gardens, and in these cases properties are sold on a freehold basis. The individual freehold 
owner has no obligation to cooperate or participate with other owners in any developments except those 
obligations established under common law. 
Where properties are sold in blocks of flats the situation is different, but it involves a leasehold rather than a 
condominium arrangement. 
The leasehold system means that, when individuals buy a flat within a bio ck, they become responsible for 
what happens within their own flats, but there also continues to be an obligation on the part of the freeholder 
to maintain the common areas and the basic structure of the property. 
So, in the British situation, the local authority that owned the whole block continues to be responsible (as the 
freeholder) for these services, and charges the leaseholders for their share of these costs. The leaseholders 
have to be consulted: there is a body of law that sets out what the freeholder can and cannot do. However, as 
long as the freeholders are working within this law, they do not require the consent of the individual 
leaseholders before embarking upon expenditure, and they can charge the leaseholders accordingly whether 
or not they have given consent.  
Consequently, the local authority continues to bear a responsibility and is accountable to tenants as well as 
owners for the way in which they fulfil that responsibility. The local authority carries out repairs and 
maintenance to common areas and to the fabric of the dwellings; 
it is argued that this responsibility removes the likelihood of the properties falling into serious disrepair. 
There are issues about how individual owners can afford the charges that derive from this, but this problem 
is resolved through other processes. There is legal provision for a change in this pattern of management and 
ownership if a sufficient number of leaseholders get together to seek to alter the arrangement under the new 
commonhold regulations, but in general the local authority or housing association to which stock has been 
transferred continues to be the freeholder and will carry out the responsibilities involved under the terms of 
the sale of the properties for the maintenance and repair of buildings. 
In situations where it is difficult to obtain agreement from individual households living in a block to incur 
expenditure for the maintenance of the fabric, the leasehold system may be a better protection of the quality 
and condition of the property, although a leasehold arrangement may not be sufficiently sensitive to the 
income and resources of households. In this sense the sale of properties in the UK has not generated the 
subsequent problems of maintenance and repair that have become apparent in Hungary or Slovenia. 
However, there are other problems that are more common across countries. There are affordability issues for 
some low-income owners who could afford the low purchase price, but have subsequent problems when 
faced with large bills for maintenance and repair (Forrest et al, 1995). More importantly, the fragmentation 
of ownership becomes a problem when the policy agenda is concerned with the improvement of properties 
rather than just maintenance and repair, or with major urban renewal. In the UK system, leaseholders can be 
charged for maintenance and repair, but they are not obliged to meet the costs of improvements and if a 
landlord embarks upon major restructuring including, for example, the demolition of properties, the landlord 
will have to buy the leasehold property by negotiation or ultimately through compulsory purchase. The 
problems faced in this situation are more comparable with the condominium-based arrangements. This is the 
point where the fragmentation of ownership be comes a real barrier to action. It is also evident in the UK 
that some tenants, and speculators operating through tenants, have identified the opportunity to make a 
speculative gain through this renewal process, and properties have been bought on estates scheduled for 
major improvement and restructuring in order to make financial gains from the process of renewal (Jones, 
2003). 
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Impacts and outcomes 
As will be evident from the discussion above, the impact and the outcomes of the privatisation process are 
very different in the various countries described here. Privatisation has had a very limited impact on estates 
in the Netherlands, and the impacts have generally been planned. The remaining estates are still 
predominantly rented; in several cases, privatisation has taken place alongside active restructuring both in 
terms of dwelling types and tenures. If the impact in the Netherlands is limited, the impact in the UK has be 
en moderate and has varied geographically, by type of property and according to tenant characteristics. If we 
were talking about some other parts of the social-rented housing stock, the impact would have been more 
substantial, but the large post-Second World War housing estates, especially those consisting of non-
traditionally built medium- and high-rise properties (flats and maisonettes), have had the lowest rates of sale 
of property in any parts of the council sector. However, 25 years on from the introduction of the Right-to-
Buy, virtually all parts of the council housing stock have been touched by privatisation. Although the 
proportions of properties sold may be low, there have been some sales in almost all parts of the stock. In the 
large estates there is mixed tenure; there are leasehold management problems in the flatted accommodation 
involved. Perhaps just as important is the increased concentration of deprived households on these estates. 
Sales of properties have been at a higher rate in other estates and the impact of this differential is that 
households seeking social-rented housing are more likely to find themselves being housed in the large post-
war estates. Whereas other estates may retain a social as well as a tenure mix, the large post-war estates are 
more likely to be affected by the general change in the profile of households in the social-rented sector. 
In the 'big bang' privatisations illustrated in this chapter by Hungary and Slovenia, the impact of 
privatisation has been more dramatic. Before 1990 public-rental housing was almost exclusively in buildings 
that were wholly state-owned and this changed dramatically. There is a school of thought that housing 
privatisation was executed too quickly, without sufficient consideration being given to all the possible 
outcomes (Turner et al, 1992; Struyk, 1996; Lowe and Tsenkova, 2003). 
In Slovenia, those who were unable to take advantage of the Right-to-Buy (non-public-housing sitting 
tenants at the time) contend that the measure was unfair, since it benefited only some, while everybody had 
participated through the monthly contributions mentioned earlier in the creation of the public housing stock. 
Disputes still continue regarding the rights of the sitting tenants and those of the new landlords of restituted 
dwellings, and there are no indications of any viable solution to the problem being found in the near future. 
Coupled with the condominium arrangements and the economic restructuring that has left many households 
with very low incomes, the privatisation of housing has transformed ownership and management processes, 
but offers no general prospect of responding to the problems associated with housing quality, maintenance, 
repair, improvement or renewal. 
 
Problems and responses 
When the large post-Second World War estates were built in each of the countries discussed in this chapter 
they were gene rally regarded as state-of-the-art neighbourhoods. They were the result of state-of-the-art 
planning, and the quality and condition of properties were regarded as very high both by the professionals 
involved and the new tenants who moved onto the estates. In the subsequent period the standing and 
condition of these estates has of ten declined (see also Chapters One and Two). The problems they present to 
policy makers and to residents have been further affected by privatisation, as described in this chapter. 
The present characteristics of these estates are now different from those pertaining when they were first 
built, and the estates also differ from each other, partly because of privatisation. The estates represent the 
layering of a number of processes and characteristics. First, there are those associated with their origins and 
initial development and their position in the housing hierarchy within cities; second are the processes of 
repair and improvement, and the adequacy of investment in the subsequent period. Layered on top of this are 
the processes of use and the changing population living in the neighbourhood; this relates in particular to the 
position of the housing tenure and the housing estate in the hierarchy of choice within cities and countries. 
Then come the changes in ownership and control associated with privatisation. It may be argued that the 
next layer is the policy responses that are emerging today and will develop over the next period. 
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The post-privatisation character of these estates is significantly different in the countries discussed in this 
chapter. There has been a divergence because of privatisation and the processes of investment in property 
associated with privatisation. In the Dutch case, privatisation may sometimes be connected to the process of 
the modernisation and renewal of estates. While there is a policy agenda involving the expansion of home 
ownership and apolitical impetus towards privatisation for its own sake, it is not this agenda that has driven 
change on the estates. In several cases estates have changed their patterns of ownership and control as part of 
the management of renewal and restructuring. Estates are at different stages in the process of change. 
Some have already been significantly modernised while others are at an early stage. Because of this time lag, 
they have different tenure mixes and different housing conditions. In some cases the estates have been 
affected by the polarisation of tenures, with the tendency for middle and higher income groups to prefer 
home ownership. However, because of the development of mixed-tenure estates, the increasing polarisation 
between tenures does not necessarily mean polarisation between estates, although polarisation within estates 
can ensue. 
This same argument applies to a lesser extent in the UK. The large post-war housing estates are generally 
perceived as the least popular and least attractive options within the portfolio of social-rented housing in the 
UK. They have higher proportions of flats and maisonettes and are generally regarded as less attractive than 
the traditionally built estates of houses with gardens that form the majority of the council housing sector. 
While the council housing sector as a whole has been affected by residualisation and socio-tenurial 
polarisation, the effect has been most pronounced in the least attractive parts of the stock; consequently, it is 
of ten the large post-war estates that have the highest rates of turnover and the lowest levels of demand. It is 
also evident that these are the estates which privatisation affects least directly. The uptake of the Right-to-
Buy is lower in these estates, so the 6:-agmentation of ownership is less. Local authorities remain as the 6:-
eeholder and have responsibilities for the maintenance of the common fabric of the dwellings. While the 
pressures on these estates arising from residualisation and polarisation and the damaged reputation of the 
estates are important, and have be en made worse by the Right-to-Buy, the fragmentation of ownership is on 
a smaller scale than in Hungary or Slovenia. Nevertheless, that fragmentation of ownership does incorporate 
an additional complication when it comes to the restructuring and renewal of these estates. Privatisation was 
not carried out with agendas related to the quality and condition of properties in mind. It was driven by 
ideological and electoral factors, and the legacy in terms of the problems of managing and restructuring 
estates is accidental, a very different state of affairs from that in the Netherlands. 
The situation in Eastern and Central European countries, as illustrated in this chapter by Hungary and 
Slovenia, is even more dramatic. In this case the drive to privatisation was associated with political and 
economic changes. If it was influenced by an explicit housing policy agenda, that was to shift the burden of 
repair and maintenance away from local authorities. However, the condominium arrangements that are the 
legacy of the policy are not operating effectively to achieve the repair, maintenance, and efficient 
management of these estates. This deficiency is especially true in relation to the properties that are in the 
worst condition, perhaps because of the poor quality of their construction, and in the estates where the 
residents have the lowest incomes. The condominium arrangement relies on mobilising consent between 
owners to carry out significant investments together. Where the repair, management, and maintenance costs 
are high and not likely to be fully reflected in sale prices, and where the owners have low incomes, consent 
is less likely to be forthcoming. At the same time the fragmented pattern of ownership presents a real barrier 
to many of the approaches to renewal and restructuring that have been adopted elsewhere, including in the 
Netherlands and the UK. Against this background the responses in Slovenia are to strengthen 
condominiums, to raise awareness among condominium flat owners about their homeownership obligations, 
and to attempt to improve the efficiency of management and renewal. In Hungary, the Condominium Act 
has been amended (decreasing the 'blocking right' of the minority of owners in the case of decisions on 
renewal) and some subsidies have been introduced to stimulate the renovation of privatised, multi-family 
buildings (Tosics, 2004). 
The nature, extent, and legacies of privatisation are very different and present different problems in relation 
to the future of these estates in the various countries considered. The immediate tasks for the agencies 
seeking to respond to the problems on the estates reflect this. Perhaps in the Netherlands the framework for 
renewal and restructuring needs very little change - until the next time major investment activity is needed. 
In the UK the process is much more complicated, and winning consent and support for major policy 
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initiatives now involves negotiation with a much more diverse assortment of interest groups and 
stakeholders. Some situations have arisen where the Right-to-Buy significantly increases the costs and 
delays associated with renewal. 
Finally, in the cases of Hungary and Slovenia, the changed legal and ownership situations present an entirely 
new challenge for policy makers; without significant funding from elsewhere the problems of winning 
consent to major initiatives may prove insurmountable. 
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